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THE SEVERAL MEANINGS OF “POLITICS” IN JUDICIAL
POLITICS STUDIES: WHY “IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCE” IS NOT
“PARTISANSHIP”
Brian Z. Tamanaha∗
INTRODUCTION
Talk about judicial politics is ubiquitous in the press and academia today.
Discussions of this topic, unfortunately, are often vague or inconsistent about
the precise meaning of politics in judging. This Essay explores several core
meanings of judicial politics to help identify what is, and what is not,
inappropriate about politics in the context of judging. The failure to mark
differences between these meanings and their implications, I argue, distorts
matters and has the potential to undermine our judicial system.
The New York Times recently ran an editorial titled Politics and the Court
sharply criticizing Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas for trampling
the line between law and politics.1 The Justices effaced this line, according to
the editorial, when they took part in a political gathering sponsored by Charles
Koch—“the conservative corporate money-raiser”2—while Citizens United v.
FEC3 was pending before the Court.4 The Times also castigated Scalia for
issuing “a rambling, sarcastic political tirade” in a recent dissent.5 Quoting
Professor Lucas Powe’s view that Scalia “is taking political partisanship to
levels not seen in over half a century,” the editorial added that “Justice Thomas
is not far behind.”6
The editorial equivocates about the role of politics in Supreme Court
decisions, asserting, “Constitutional law is political. It results from choices
about concerns of government that political philosophers ponder, like liberty

∗

William Gardiner Hammond Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.
Editorial, Politics and the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2011, at A16.
2 Id.
3 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (provoking controversy by holding that corporations have a constitutionally
protected First Amendment right to participate in the electoral process through campaign contributions).
4 See Editorial, supra note 1.
5 Id.
6 Id.
1
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and property. When the court deals with major issues of social policy, the law
it shapes is the most inescapably political.”7
The editorial then seemingly does a U-turn:
To buffer justices from the demands of everyday politics,
however, they receive tenure for life. The framers of our Constitution
envisioned law gaining authority apart from politics. They wanted
justices to exercise their judgment independently—to be free from
worrying about upsetting the powerful and certainly not to be
8
cultivating powerful political interests.

The Times editorial implicitly gestures at a distinction between the high
politics of principle and grand social policy, and the low politics of crass, left–
right, Republican–Democrat partisanship.9 A century ago, Felix Frankfurter
pointed to the same distinction, positing, “[C]onstitutional law, in its relation to
social legislation, is not at all a science, but applied politics, using the word in
its noble sense.”10 Another political scientist further asserts that high politics
can be understood as “consistent ideological policymaking,” a positive feature
that keeps law responsive to evolving extralegal views and circumstances.11
“Problems emerge only when judges appear to decide on the basis of petty
partisanship, forsaking high politics for low.”12
Making no distinction between high and low politics, a Washington Post
article (published a few days after the Times editorial) described judging in
bluntly political terms: “Party affiliation is not a perfect predictor of a judge’s
behavior, but studies have shown that Democratic and Republican nominees
vote differently on some ideologically charged issues, such as abortion, gay
rights and capital punishment.”13 The point of the article is that President
Obama has a major opportunity to reshape the political orientation of the
federal courts through his judicial appointments:

7

Id.
Id.
9 See id.
10 Felix Frankfurter, Law Officer, Bureau of Insular Affairs, The Zeitgeist and the Judiciary, Address at
the Twenty-fifth Anniversary Dinner of the Harvard Law Review (1912), in LAW AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL
PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 1913–1938, at 3, 6 (Archibald MacLeish & E.F. Prichard, Jr. eds., 1939).
11 See KEITH J. BYBEE, ALL JUDGES ARE POLITICAL—EXCEPT WHEN THEY ARE NOT: ACCEPTABLE
HYPOCRISIES AND THE RULE OF LAW 27–28 (Austin Sarat ed., 2010).
12 Id. at 27 (describing the position of Terri Peretti).
13 Jerry Markon & Shailagh Murray, Vacancies on Federal Bench Hit Crisis Point, WASH. POST, Feb. 8,
2011, at A01.
8
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When he took office, Democratic appointees had small majorities on
two appeals courts—the New York-based 2nd Circuit and the 9th
Circuit. Obama’s nominees have also given Democrats control of the
4th Circuit and the 3rd Circuit, which covers Pennsylvania, New
Jersey and Delaware.
The 4th Circuit is an influential voice on national security and one
of the appellate courts expected to hear challenges to the health-care
overhaul law. It has a 9 to 5 Democratic majority, because of four
14
Obama appointees.

Political scientists who do empirical research on courts in a field known as
“judicial politics”15 and conduct “studies” like those alluded to by the Post16
also frequently describe judging in political terms. In Advice and Consent, two
leading researchers, Lee Epstein and Jeffrey Segal, assert:
Presidents, senators, and interest groups alike realize that the judges
themselves are political. Candidates for the federal bench receive
their nominations precisely because through their political work or
interests they came to the attention of some politician, most likely a
U.S. senator or a member of the president’s staff. Judges retain these
partisan and ideological attachments when they ascend to the bench.
When Socrates was on trial for his life, he may have refused to
appeal to the “emotions” of judges out of the belief that the judge
“has sworn that he will judge according to the laws and not according
to his own good pleasure.” But the late great political scientist C.
Herman Pritchett was far closer to the mark when he wrote that
judges “are influenced by their own biases and philosophies, which
to a large degree predetermine the position they will take on a given
question. Private attitudes, in other words, become public law.”
That is why senators and presidents care so deeply about who sits
on the federal bench—and so should we. If the decisions of federal
judges reflected only the law or other “neutral” principles, then
neither senators nor presidents would be able to fulfill their policy
goals through appointments. But, as Pritchett so astutely observed,
this “principled approach” does not always or even usually hold. In
fact, with scattered exceptions here and there, the decisions of judges,
and especially the decisions of Supreme Court justices, tend to reflect
their own political values. More indirectly, these decisions also
14

Id.
See Nancy Maveety, The Study of Judicial Behavior and the Discipline of Political Science, in THE
PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 1, 2–3 (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003) (referring to the study of courts as both
the study of “law and courts” and the study of “judicial politics,” and seemingly favoring “the study of judicial
politics” as the preferred label).
16 See Markon & Murray, supra note 13.
15
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reflect the judges’ partisan affiliation, which just so happens to
17
coincide often with that of their appointing president.

While the authors acknowledge that judges below the Supreme Court are
subject to greater legal restraints, they insist that “[j]udges are political, and
their politics seep[] into their decisions.”18 This was “always” (or at least since
1800) true, according to Epstein and Segal, and will remain so “for a very long
time.”19
Although judges may sincerely believe that their decisions are governed by
the law, their political views subtly color their legal decisions—either
knowingly or via cognitive biases, motivated reasoning, or some other
mechanism—according to political scientists.20 However it comes about, the
bottom line of these analyses is that judicial decisions reflect politics. As one
overview of research in the field put it, “Democratic appointees cast liberal
votes more often than Republican appointees.”21
The same message is relentlessly hammered home by bestselling author
Mark Smith in Disrobed: The New Battle Plan to Break the Left’s Stranglehold
on the Courts.22 We must disabuse ourselves of myths about the rule of law
and apolitical judging, urges Smith.23 “Judges don’t—and can’t—check their
ideology at the courtroom door; they often, by necessity, function as politicians
wearing black robes.”24 Smith further contends:
No doubt about it, judges are political actors. They regularly deal
with complex, politically charged cases, and sometimes they are
required (or choose) to make law rather than merely “interpret” it. In
any given case, judges must somehow make sense of all the
conflicting claims in order to reach a decision; that decision will
inevitably be informed by the judges’ own ideology, priorities, and,
25
yes, biases.

17 LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
3 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
18 Id. at 143.
19 Id. at 143–45.
20 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 33–35 (2005).
21 Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 838 (2008).
22 MARK W. SMITH, DISROBED: THE NEW BATTLE PLAN TO BREAK THE LEFT’S STRANGLEHOLD ON THE
COURTS (2006).
23 See id. at 10–13.
24 Id. at 11.
25 Id. at 48.
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Smith aims to persuade conservatives to do their utmost to stock the federal
and state judiciary with judges who are willing to engage in judicial activism to
overturn liberal precedents and entrench conservative values and policies in the
law.26 This is merely a turnabout in fair play, Smith argues, for that is precisely
what liberal judges have done before.27 (Smith conveniently ignores that
Republican presidents have long applied a conservative litmus test to select
judicial appointees28 and have appointed a majority of judges currently sitting
on the federal bench—fifty-six percent by the time George W. Bush left
office.29)
Conservatives who decry judicial activism and insist upon judicial
adherence to the rule of law are fools pining for a myth, he implies. “Judicial
activism is the rule of law,” Smith declares, “[because] judges themselves are
the ones who define what the rule of law is.”30 Justices Scalia and Thomas are
“moderates,” unnecessarily tying themselves down by their fealty to textualism
and originalism;31 these theories of legal interpretation do not provide
sufficiently determinate answers to many questions, he insists.32
“We need results-oriented judges,”33 Smith advocates. Additionally, Smith
explains:
[D]on’t forget that a judgeship is anything but apolitical. . . .
Thus we need judges who have the right values and beliefs, just
as we want legislators and presidents who champion our values and
beliefs. And we should learn about prospective judges’ values and
beliefs before they don black robes and are given almost unlimited
power to direct the law. Our priority cannot be confirming judges
who buy into mostly meaningless platitudes about “respecting the
rule of law” and “abiding by the Constitution”; it should be
confirming judges who recognize the importance of advancing the
conservative cause, which naturally encompasses the nation’s
fundamental ideals and freedoms, and the American way of life.
When we select legislators and presidents, we demand to know
26
27
28

See id. at 4–15, 102–03.
See id. at 14, 102–03.
See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW

AS A

MEANS

TO AN

END: THREAT

TO THE

RULE

OF

LAW 175–85

(2006).
29

See Markon & Murray, supra note 13.
SMITH, supra note 22, at 13; see also id. at 76 (describing a case in which judicial activism played a
significant role in abandoning precedent).
31 Id. at 117.
32 See id. at 60–67.
33 Id. at 115.
30
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where they stand on major issues; we should expect nothing less of
judges, who also profoundly affect virtually every major policy
dispute in contemporary America. . . .
Following the Reagan model, conservative judges must aim to
win. Just as President Reagan challenged the status quo and reversed
the country’s path toward socialism, recession, and failed foreign
policies, we need judges with the backbone to aggressively challenge
the status quo and attack many of the current assumptions that
characterize our legal system. A Judicial Reagan would not be
content merely to thwart ongoing liberal legal machinations but
would also work to undo “well-established” liberal precedents,
34
pushing the law back to the right.

Smith cannot be dismissed as an uninformed extremist. As noted above,
judicial politics scholars also insist that judging is essentially political and
dismiss textual and originalist theories of interpretation.35 And it would be
foolhardy to underestimate Smith’s potential impact. A member of the bar,
Smith engages in litigation on behalf of conservative causes, writes bestselling
books, and is a frequent commentator on various television and print media
outlets.36
Reaching a wide audience, Smith argues that, because judging is political,
conservatives must abjure weak-kneed squeamishness and get on with the
politicization of the judiciary.37 Liberals who hear his message might take the
same advice to heart, albeit in the opposite political direction. Smith’s
polemical tract is the latest manifestation of the widespread notion that the law
is an instrument to be seized by groups to advance their goals (in the name of
the common good)—utilizing every aspect of the legal apparatus, including
judges, to entrench their own views in the law.38
Constant reinforcements of the view that judging is political are found in
news reports that highlight evidently political splits between Justices in highprofile cases,39 like Bush v. Gore40 and Citizens United,41 in increasingly
34

Id. at 102–03.
SEGAL ET AL., supra note 20, at 25–30.
36 Biography of Mark W. Smith, SMITH VALLIERE PLLC, http://www.marksmithlawgroup.com/partners.
html (last visited July 5, 2012).
37 SMITH, supra note 22, at 56–57.
38 See TAMANAHA, supra note 28, at 1.
39 See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Supreme Court Riven by Partisan Politics, CNN (Mar. 15, 2010), http://
articles.cnn.com/2010-03-15/opinion/toobin.court.partisan_1_supreme-court-roberts-chief-justice?_s=PM:
OPINION (discussing the political effects of Citizens United and arguing that “the events of the last few weeks
show that the Supreme Court is riven by the same partisan divisions as the rest of Washington”); Will U.S.
35
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expensive and harsh political campaigns for state judicial elections,42 and in
seemingly political court decisions about matters like gay marriage (and the
successful electoral efforts to unseat the Iowa Supreme Court justices who
rendered such a decision).43 Prominent political scientists and law professors
write books, articles, and op-eds in leading newspapers announcing that
judging is political.44 One of the most influential public intellectuals and legal
figures in the country, Judge Richard Posner, flatly declares in a book on
judging, “So judging is political.”45
The message has gotten through. Several polls show that a substantial
proportion of Americans believe that political ideology influences judging.46 A
2005 Maxwell Poll conducted by Syracuse University found that
82 percent of the American public thought that the partisan
background of judges influenced court decisionmaking either some or
a lot. This political perception was widely held. The poll found that
an overwhelming majority of liberals (88 percent), conservatives (83
percent), people who attend religious services several times a week
(84 percent), and people who never attend religious services (88
percent) all agreed that partisanship did not switch off when judicial
47
robes were put on.

There is more to this picture, however. The same poll found that “[s]eventythree percent of those surveyed agreed that judges should continue to be
shielded from outside pressure and allowed to make decisions based on their
own independent reading of the law.”48 Hence, people appear to believe that
judicial decisions are, and should be, determined by the law while

Supreme Court Justices Get Along in Bush v. Gore Aftermath?, CNN (Dec. 13, 2000), http://articles.cnn.com/
2000-12-13/justice/scotus.relations_1_supreme-court-clerks-current-justices-justices-antonin-scalia?_s=PM:
LAW (“The justices were accused of political partisanship.”).
40 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
41 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
42 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices Issue a Rule of Recusal in Cases of Judges’ Big Donors, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2009, at A1 (“Thirty-nine states, including New York, elect at least some of their judges, and election
campaigns, particularly for state supreme courts, have in recent years grown increasingly expensive and
nasty.”).
43 See Grant Schulte, Iowans Dismiss Three Justices, DES MOINES REG. (Nov. 3, 2010, 5:26 AM), http://
www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20101103/NEWS09/11030390/Iowans-dismiss-three-justices.
44 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006).
45 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 369 (2008).
46 See BYBEE, supra note 11, at 6–25.
47 Id. at 16 (endnote omitted).
48 Id. at 17.
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simultaneously accepting that the personal views of judges influence their
decisions.
This seeming ambivalence is also prevalent in accounts by political
scientists and legal scholars. After declaring that judging is political, Judge
Posner tacks in the opposite direction: “But judging is not just personal and
political. It is also impersonal and nonpolitical in the sense that many, indeed
most, judicial decisions really are the product of neutral application of rules not
made up for the occasion to facts fairly found.”49
Although quantitative studies find that ideology has an influence on
judicial decisions, the effect is usually small.50 “In most domains, the division
between Republican and Democratic appointees, while [statistically]
significant, is far from huge; the law, as such, seems to be having a
constraining effect.”51 This must be true, at least for federal appellate courts,
where 97% of decisions are issued without a dissent;52 regardless of their
differences in political viewpoints, Republican and Democratic judges concur
in their legal judgment an overwhelming majority of the time. On the Supreme
Court, “33% of the cases were decided 9–0 in the October 2008 term and
another 18% were decided by lopsided 8–1 or 7–2 margins.”53 In the latest
expression of this apparent ambivalence, Linda Greenhouse, the dean of
Supreme Court reporters, expressed surprise and puzzlement that the votes of
Justices in the current term have (thus far) not fallen along expected political
lines.54
These views raise a question that returns us to the Times editorial quoted at
the outset of this Essay55: Can judging be understood as distinctively legal in a
way that does not deny its political elements? Or does a realistic view of the
political influences on judging—the self-proclaimed stance of judicial politics
scholars—necessarily lead to Mark Smith’s argument that savvy conservative
49

POSNER, supra note 45, at 370.
See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST–REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN
JUDGING 132–52 (2010).
51 Miles & Sunstein, supra note 21, at 844. I have inserted the word “statistically” to modify the term
“significant,” because the failure to include this creates a misleading impression of the results as statistical
significance is about the reliability of a finding, not about the size of the actual impact found. See id. at 145.
52 See Jeffrey S. Sutton, A Review of Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think (2008), 108 MICH. L. REV.
859, 862 (2010). Sutton is a federal judge on the Sixth Circuit.
53 Id.
54 See Linda Greenhouse, A Surprising Snapshot, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR BLOG (Mar. 23, 2011, 9:54
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/23/a-surprising-snapshot/.
55 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
50
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political activists would seek to appoint judges who will aggressively advance
their political preferences in their legal decisions?
The answer lies not in the difference between high and low politics—which
is a blurry distinction at best and ultimately the wrong axis on which to
measure judicial politics—but in distinguishing “ideological influence” from
“partisanship.” The distinction can be best understood by examining the
various ways one may understand the relationship between politics and
judging.
I. THE FIVE MEANINGS OF “POLITICS” IN JUDGING
Some forms of politics are inherent to judging, some are beneficial, and
some are contrary to the judicial role and corrosive of the law. While the five
meanings of “politics” in judging below are not exhaustive, they frequently
recur in the literature about judging and politics. This brief discussion will
clarify their implications.
A. Law as a Subspecies of Politics
Political science takes as its domain all institutions of government. From
this standpoint, legal institutions are an integral element of the political
apparatus of the state. “The political scientists,” explains leading judicialpolitics scholar Martin Shapiro, “said that the Court was part of politics even
though it was a court of law, because all law, including constitutional law, was
a part of politics.”56 When politics is understood in Aristotelian terms to
involve the creation and pursuit of a moral community, “[l]aw, being an
instrument and a product of this pursuit, is indeed a subspecies of politics.”57
Viewed as cogs in the political apparatus of government, judges are political
actors. When political scientists say judges are political, they often mean it in
this sense, Shapiro claims.58 When legal professionals see the term “political”
appended to judges, according to Shapiro, their resulting “distress is caused by
a rather simple-minded confusion about the word politics and what it means.”59

56 Martin Shapiro, Morality and the Politics of Judging, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1555, 1555–56 (1989)
(reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, & LAW (1988)).
57 Id. at 1558.
58 Id. at 1555–58.
59 Id. at 1556.
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B. Politics as Producing Public Policy
Politics can also be commonly understood as a process (any process) that
produces public-policy decisions.60 Through the declaration, construction,
interpretation, and application of the law, judges play a role in the creation and
implementation of public policy. For well over a century, lawyers and judges
have explicitly recognized that judges make law.61 The common law—
contracts, property, and torts—literally is a domain of judge-made law.
Prominent Anglo-American jurists have repeatedly acknowledged that judges
make public-policy decisions in the course of deciding cases, not just on
common law subjects but also in the interpretation and application of statutes
and the Constitution.62
In 1903, First Circuit Judge LeBaron Colt asserted that it has always been
the special role of lawyers and courts “to keep the law in harmony with social
progress, to make it more reasonable as social necessities and public sentiment
have demanded.”63 He further stated:
Ever recognizing that “the matter changeth, the custom, the contracts,
the commerce, the dispositions, educations, and tempers of men and
societies,” they have conceived theories, invoked doctrines, and
inaugurated instrumentalities to relieve the situation. They have
carried on judicial legislation from the infancy of the law in order that
it might advance with society. By the adoption of broad and elastic
rules of interpretation, they have maintained, in large measure, the
64
supreme law of the land in harmony with national growth . . . .

Colt acknowledged that judges invoke the “doctrine of reasonableness” and
“liberally” construe statutory and constitutional provisions to modify the law to
accommodate social changes.65
Another high-profile federal circuit judge at the time, Charles F. Amidon,
remarked that “[t]he fact that the Supreme Court in constitutional cases so
frequently stands five to four, each division assigning weighty reasons for
diametrically opposite views, shows plainly how much the Constitution in

60

Id. at 1557–58.
See TAMANAHA, supra note 50, at 17–21.
62 See, e.g., Charles F. Amidon, The Nation and the Constitution, 19 GREEN BAG 594, 598 (1907);
LeBaron B. Colt, Law and Reasonableness, 37 AM. L. REV. 657, 674 (1903).
63 Colt, supra note 62, at 674.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 670, 673.
61
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actual application is a matter of interpretation.”66 He added that
“[c]onstitutional cases are . . . frequently decided not upon the language of the
Constitution, but upon conflicting notions of life.”67 Like Colt, Amidon was
not saying anything radical, for what he said was beyond dispute. Five-to-four
rulings speak for themselves.
Public-policy decisions by judges are unavoidable because the law does not
definitively answer every question; judges must fill in gaps and deal with
unanticipated situations, and they must adjust the law to new circumstances.
The legal system would be dysfunctional if judges were prohibited from
issuing a decision each time the law failed to dictate a clear answer, and
portions of the law would be obsolete if judges did not adjust it to keep up with
social change.68 Political views are reflected in these decisions because policy
decisions in contested matters necessarily will line up with some positions but
not others (prompting accusations of political judging from opponents). This
aspect of judging is an elaboration of the point made above: judges are a key
component of the political apparatus of government. Their task is to tend the
legal garden—common law, statutes, the Constitution, and legal principles—
maintaining the functional utility of law through a multitude of day-to-day
judicial decisions.69
This aspect of judging is well recognized. A 2006 follow-up to the
Maxwell Poll70 asked respondents whether they agreed with the statement,
“Since the Constitution must be updated to reflect society’s values as they exist
today, Supreme Court judges have a great deal of leeway in decisions, even
when they claim to be ‘interpreting’ the Constitution.”71 The study found that
“[o]ver 70 percent of respondents agreed.”72 The question is framed in a loaded
fashion (assuming that the Constitution must be updated), but the high
affirmative response implies general acceptance of the proposition that judging
involves flexibility.

66

Amidon, supra note 62, at 598.
Id. at 599.
68 See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Review Essay, A Vision of Social–Legal Change: Rescuing Ehrlich from
“Living Law,” 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 297, 316 (2011).
69 This view of the law is supported in TAMANAHA, supra note 50.
70 See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
71 BYBEE, supra note 11, at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72 Id.
67
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C. Politics as Ideology
“Politics” is also often used as synonymous with “ideology”—an opaque
term that encompasses the totality of a judge’s views about politics, morality,
economics, society, religion, and life.73 At the broadest level, this includes
political and moral principles; at the mundane level, this contains beliefs on
important matters. Ideology-tinged influences seep into judges’ decisions in
various subtle ways: shaping and reflecting the content of beliefs, and affecting
the way facts are perceived (through perceptual framing and cognitive biases)
and how a judge reasons (motivated reasoning to support preferred
outcomes).74
Judges are influenced by these background views when dealing with openended legal standards like the balancing test, fairness, reasonableness, and the
best interest of the child, as well as the contexts in which the law accords
discretion to a judge.75 These influences affect the policy choices judges make
in the course of interpretation, as described above.They also shape a judge’s
sense of justice. The theory of interpretation a judge adopts—Posner’s
pragmatism76 or Easterbrook’s textualism77—in hard cases or when dealing
with broad constitutional provisions is a product of the judge’s views about
law, language, rules, and the proper judicial role in a democratic government.
When the law runs out, when equally plausible alternative interpretations of a
set of legal provisions point to different outcomes, or when applicable legal
provisions conflict, a judge must draw from background ideological views if
any answer is to be given.78
Ideological influences operate in two qualitatively distinct ways—the first
relating to human decision making and the second to legal factors—neither of
which can be entirely eliminated. In the former respect, human perception,
73 See Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About when We Talk About Ideology: Judicial Politics
Scholarship and Naive Legal Realism, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 231, 235–38 (2009).
74 See Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 887–902 (2009).
75 See Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 430 (2007) (“Because legal
norms by definition have less force where discretion exists, other motivations will likely play a stronger role.
To the extent that those motivations include policy preferences, the variation that is observed will correlate
with the judges’ ideology.”).
76 See TAMANAHA, supra note 28, at 127–30.
77 See TAMANAHA, supra note 50, at 178, 183.
78 See Eric J. Miller, Judicial Preference, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1275, 1321–34 (2008) (arguing that
“pragmatic permissions” enable a judge to exercise personal choice in selecting among legally valid
alternatives).
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judgment, and reasoning are always subject to cognitive influences—
ideology—and judging is no exception. Much of the influence is subconscious;
judges can sometimes become aware of such influences and strive to overcome
them, but these influences are a normal aspect of human cognition. Any legal
system with human judges must accept a certain level of ideological influence
in this form—to insist otherwise is to demand the impossible.
The latter respect, relating to legal factors, is also, to some extent,
inevitable. Sometimes the applicable law requires the judge to determine
matters that involve judgment (as with fairness or reasonableness standards), or
sometimes no decision can be issued without such resort (as when no clear
legal answer exists). A duty is imposed on judges to render a decision
regardless of gaps, ambiguities, inconsistencies, or uncertainties in the law.79
Although the inherent limitations of human reasoning, legal rules and
standards, and law allow ideological influences to seep into judicial decisions,
these factors are not so pervasive or vicious that they defeat rule-bound
decision making. To the contrary, most of the time, the implications of most
legal rules are clear, and judges understand and apply them in a similar fashion
regardless of ideological influences. Ideology matters, albeit relatively little, as
many quantitative studies of judging have found.80
D. Politics in Controversial Issues
Another common occurrence involving politics and courts is when judges
step into the middle of major contested political issues of the day—issues that
many people believe elected representatives should decide, rather than
unelected judges. On health care reform, gay marriage, campaign finance
restrictions, affirmative action, environmental regulation, and many other
subjects, courts have a major say in what our polity can and cannot do. The rise
of cause litigation since the 1970s has brought to courts a constant supply of
legal actions to advance controversial causes.81 Virtually every notable piece of

79 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.7 (2007) (“A judge shall hear and decide matters
assigned to the judge . . . .”).
80 See TAMANAHA, supra note 50, at 132–55 (finding that, although some cases are influenced by politics
or subconscious biases, the assumption that judging is pervasively political is erroneous).
81 See TAMANAHA, supra note 28, at 156–71.
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legislation (and administrative action) must run a gauntlet of legal challenges
brought by those who oppose it.82
When the populace is closely divided on an issue with emotions running
hot, any outcome will provoke a backlash in which the losing side charges the
court with playing politics because both parties are convinced that the law
stands firmly with them. When the issues at stake are widely seen as a political
matter, then almost by definition, the decision is political. For many observers,
the legal justification supplied by the judge for the decision is largely beside
the point. Even people pleased with a decision might still object to the fact that
judges have a decisive say over issues that, in a democracy, ought to be
determined by politically accountable officials.
E. Politics in Judicial Appointments
The fifth form of judicial politics is the prominent role ideological
considerations play in federal and state judicial appointments. For most of the
history of the nation, federal judicial appointments were a matter of
patronage.83 Not anymore.
Starting with Ronald Reagan, presidents have screened judicial appointees
for their ideological views.84 Democratic and Republican senators also
carefully vet nominees, using filibusters and lengthy delays to derail candidates
who are politically unpalatable.85 Similarly, in the past two decades, state
judicial elections, once sleepy affairs, have become highly political and costly,
with millions of dollars spent on state supreme court judges—the money
flowing in from political opponents and supporters.86 The politicization of
judicial appointments is in full swing and getting worse.
* * *
When one adds up the preceding five senses of politics in judging, it seems
sensible to pay close attention to the political views of judicial appointees.
82 See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 13–14 (2001)
(discussing how, in the American legal system, all major policy issues eventually become judicial issues
litigated by competing interests).
83 Evan A. Evans, Political Influences in the Selection of Federal Judges, 1948 WIS. L. REV. 330, 330.
84 Sheldon Goldman, Reaganizing the Judiciary: The First Term Appointments, 68 JUDICATURE 313, 315
(1985).
85 See TAMANAHA, supra note 28, at 172–85 (discussing modern efforts by political coalitions to prevent
the dominance of one ideological viewpoint).
86 Id. at 185–89.
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First, judges are a part of the political apparatus of government. Second, judges
make public policy in the course of developing the common law and when
interpreting statutes and the Constitution. Third, the background ideological
views of judges influence how they perceive the facts, interpret the law, apply
standards, fill in gaps and resolve contradictions, choose an answer from
among equally plausible decisions, pick a theory of interpretation, think about
justice, and decide policy questions. Fourth, judges sometimes render decisions
that affect the shape and outcome of major political issues of the day. Fifth,
screening judges for their political views almost necessarily follows from the
above.
All five senses of politics, furthermore, are magnified at the level of the
Supreme Court. It is the titular head of the legal–political apparatus of
government, it makes public-policy judgments (though fewer in volume than
appellate courts), it has the highest relative proportion of open-ended cases in
the federal judicial hierarchy, and it takes up many highly salient political
issues.87 For all these reasons, Supreme Court appointees are subjected to
careful ideological screening and extremely political confirmation proceedings.
II. WHY SMITH IS WRONG AND HIS VIEW DESTRUCTIVE
A hard-nosed view of matters seemingly pushes us in the direction of
Smith, the polemicist who argues that the rule of law is a myth and that the
smart move is to appoint judges who have no qualms about achieving desired
conservative outcomes, exploiting legal indeterminacy or twisting the law, if
necessary, to get there.88 It’s not clear what judicial-politics scholars would say
in response to Smith, because their descriptive accounts of judging match his,
though they stop short of advocating aggressive judicial activism.89
A. Differentiating Between Good-Faith and Bad-Faith Judging
The response to Smith lies in drawing out the implications of the difference
between good-faith and bad-faith judging. When ideology has an influence in
the two ways set forth above (coloring human cognition and filling in open
legal questions), judges deciding in good faith are not aggressively seeking to
implement their political views in the law, as Smith advocates, but rather are
87

See TAMANAHA, supra note 50, at 197–99.
See SMITH, supra note 22, at 102–03.
89 See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text (discussing Epstein and Segal’s contention that judicial
decisions reflect political values).
88
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striving to satisfy their judicial duty to decide cases in a neutral fashion as
required by the law.90 Their orientation is to produce the correct legal answer;
ideological influences on the judges’ decisions are screened through, and thus
constrained by, this legal orientation. Ideology comes through, owing to
limitations in human reasoning and openness in the law, while judges do the
best they can to deliver rule-bound decisions despite these limitations.
Things would be very different if judges dropped the effort to be bound by
the law and purposefully twisted the law whenever necessary to achieve
preferred political outcomes. That is bad-faith judging. If all judges did this,
there would be greater uncertainty and variation in legal decisions, reducing
predictability in the law. A world of difference—the fundamental line that
separates law and politics—exists between ideological influences that
subconsciously shape decision making and inform open-ended legal
judgments, and conscious manipulation of legal rules for political ends.
This distinction helps avoid a major source of potential confusion in the
literature. Partisanship, in the judicial context, means improperly favoring one
side over the other in a given action. When the law does not point to a single
correct answer or when judges are required to exercise discretion or judgment,
and the judge’s decision is colored by her ideological views, the charge of
partisanship—a rebuke of the judge for violating the obligation of neutrality—
is inapt (assuming the judge decides in good faith). Because the decision must
align with one side or the other in a politically charged dispute, whatever a
judge decides comes across as “partisan.” If this is what partisanship means, it
would be impossible for judges to render a nonpartisan decision in open-ended
cases. But that is absurd and empties the word of meaning.
Continuing with this analysis, because all human decision making, judging
included, is subject to cognitive influences, it makes no sense to charge that an
ideologically colored decision is partisan on that basis alone, for that would
apply a standard nigh impossible to meet. Cognitive influences cannot be
entirely eradicated (although a judge can sometimes be made aware of them
and can, through a conscious effort, shake free of some of their influence). But
a truly partisan judge is one who decides in bad faith.
In sum, ideological influence does not equal partisanship. Political
scientists cloud this vital distinction when they loosely assert, as Epstein and
Segal do, that “[j]udges retain these partisan and ideological attachments when
90

See SMITH, supra note 22, at 102–03.
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they ascend to the bench.”91 Judges do not ascend to the bench tabula rasa,
wiped free of their moral, political, and economic views (blank slates would be
incapable of rendering judgments of any kind). In this sense, they indeed retain
their ideological attachments. But that is not partisanship. Partisanship is what
Smith proposes: that judges decide cases with a conscious conservative or
liberal agenda driving their legal analyses.
B. Reanalyzing the Five Meanings of “Politics” in Judging
Now, we can reexamine the five senses of politics from a more nuanced
perspective. They all share a common quality: judges themselves are not
primarily responsible for each of the ways politics make their way into
judging. First, judges cannot be condemned for the fact that the court is part of
the political apparatus of government. Second, judges make public-policy
decisions because the legal tasks they handle call for it. Third, ideology colors
all human perception and decision making, and the law regularly presents
uncertain or open questions that must be answered. Fourth, judges decide
politically charged issues because such cases are brought to them by others.
Fifth, it is others, not the judges themselves, who insist upon using ideological
litmus tests to screen judicial candidates.
With respect to the first and second senses of politics, judges should be
commended for the essential services they provide to the political/legal system.
As for the third sense, we cannot berate judges or accuse them of violating
their legal role because they suffer from human limitations and make decisions
that the law does not answer on its own. On the fourth sense, we can be
troubled by the outsized role judges have come to play in political affairs, yet
recognize that these cases are put upon them (although judges should be
careful to restrict the extent to which their decisions impinge upon political
questions). On the fifth sense, candidates for judicial office deserve our
sympathy for being subjected to personal scrutiny and distortion to an extent
that few people in public employment must endure.
Every discussion of politics in judging must start with an awareness that
none of the five senses of politics are routine or pervasive aspects of judging.
They are most present at the highest level of judging but far less so at lower
court levels. The failure of the Post article to note this when discussing the
make up of federal appellate courts made it more misleading than

91

EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 17, at 3.
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informative.92 The meaning and application of legal rules are clear most of the
time; public-policy decisions are infrequent; judges come to the same legal
conclusion a substantial portion of the time regardless of differences in their
political ideology; and after the glare of appointments and elections, they work
in relative obscurity, mostly dealing with mundane or technical legal issues,
except for the occasional burst of media attention that accompanies a
controversial decision.
Judging is a structured practice that takes place within legal institutions
through the medium of legal materials. All political influences on judging—all
public-policy products of judging—are subject to and filtered by this legal
milieu. The decision-making output of judges is distinctively legal,
notwithstanding these five aspects of politics, and this legal quality makes the
legal results generally predictable by lawyers. This is not to deny that some
legal decisions, by some judges, some of the time, are thoroughly political, but
examples of bad-faith judging are infrequent and atypical. Even on supreme
courts, where political factors have the greatest play, judges render decisions in
contexts thickly structured by the law.
Doubters of law and judging—those who harp on legal indeterminacy and
scoff at assertions of the high degree of legal efficacy93—should contemplate
the many ways their own affairs depend upon a background framework of
legal rules. Whoever has an employment contract, rents or buys an apartment,
takes out a loan or uses a credit card, purchases medical insurance, contributes
to a pension fund, gets a divorce, makes a will, gets into an automobile
accident, or robs a bank, will quickly learn, when things go badly, that a great
deal of the law is relatively straightforward and will be applied by judges as
written. (This predictability, combined with the expense of legal proceedings,
explains why the vast majority of situations are resolved without ever going to
trial.) It’s easy to say judging is politics in the abstract, but these political
elements do not loom large in the bulk of routine legal work.
CONCLUSION
Politics do matter in judging, as political scientists and Mark Smith insist,
so the question remains how the role of politics in judging should be
understood. All five political aspects are givens of contemporary judging: the

92
93

See Markon & Murray, supra note 13.
See, e.g., EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 17.
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first, second, and third are, for different reasons, inherent to judging; the fourth
and fifth have become entrenched in our system and are unlikely to diminish.
Judges cannot be entirely free of politics in any of these senses.
What judges can do is decide cases in good faith according to the law in a
nonpartisan fashion. This is embodied in the judicial code of conduct: “A judge
shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office
fairly and impartially.”94 Under this standard, a judge whose decision is subject
to background political influences can still be an impartial, nonpartisan judge,
as long as the judge does her best to render a decision based upon the law
without consciously favoring one side or pursuing a particular objective.95
This explains what might appear to be a contradictory set of beliefs about
judging:
[J]udges at every level routinely present their decisions as being
objective and fair, and a large majority of the public accepts the
judicial displays of evenhandedness as true. This belief in
impartiality is supported by scholarship that shows the judicial
process to be infused with legal principle. Clearly, judicial
impartiality is a central component of judicial legitimacy.
And yet, in addition to believing that judges are impartial arbiters,
a large majority of the public also believes that judicial
decisionmaking across the board is influenced by political
preference. This belief is supported by scholarship that shows the
judicial process to be permeated by political claims and
96
commitments.

There is nothing mysterious or inconsistent about this juxtaposition of beliefs
and research findings about judging.
A judge who consciously strives to be impartial and to issue the correct
legal decision satisfies her judicial obligation to decide in accordance with the
law in the only way this can be humanly achieved, regardless of whether
political views color the opinion. Justices Scalia and Thomas are not
necessarily being improperly political just because their decisions align with
their political views a substantial proportion of the time. Their political

94

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 (2007).
See id. R. 2.2 cmt. 2 (“Although each judge comes to the bench with a unique background and
personal philosophy, a judge must interpret and apply the law without regard to whether the judge approves or
disapproves of the law in question.”).
96 BYBEE, supra note 11, at 84.
95
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activities outside the court also do not make them partisan judges (although it
fuels this suspicion among critics). They would be truly political if their legal
reasoning were not genuinely oriented toward coming to the correct legal
answer—if they were to decide in bad faith, consciously seeking to implement
their political views in the law.
This understanding provides the basis for a response to Smith. He is wrong
to infer from the undeniable fact of ideological influence that the rule of law is
a fraud and that, therefore, judges should disregard precedent and aggressively
engage in results-oriented reasoning. That kind of judicial decision making
would breach the obligation of impartiality—it would be partisan. The rule of
law works despite ideological influences precisely because judges do their
utmost to fulfill their duty to abide by the law. If what Smith suggests becomes
widely practiced by judges, the system will change from the current one, in
which the law is overwhelmingly dominant in judicial decision making
(leavened with political influences), to one that is consummately political. That
would spell the demise of the law.

